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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law- Jurisdiction of State Over Nonresident
Selling Within the State Exclusively by Mail-The Travelers Health
Association, a Nebraska concern, sold insurance by mail to Virginia resi-
dents without complying with the requirements of the Virginia Blue Sky
Law.' New business was solicited by old members of the Association who
secured prospects' names and forwarded them to the home office. In a
cease and desist order proceeding 2 initiated by the Virginia Corporation
Commission, Travelers was served by registered mail, and the Association
appeared "specially" for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the Commission. The highest state court rejected contentions that this
procedure violated "due process." 3 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court sustained Virginia's jurisdiction, holding that appellants had carried
on sufficient activities with residents of the state to make them amenable
to the state's police power in a cease and desist action. Travelers Health
Association et al. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
In the past, a court's jurisdiction over a person has depended on the
person's presence in the forum making him amenable to personal service
of process, or on his voluntary general appearance at the trial of the action.
4
However, due to the great increase of business activity carried on across
state lines, the strict territorial requirements of jurisdiction have undergone
modification in order to allow states to protect the interests of their citi-
zens.5 By considering that a nonresident "impliedly consented" to a state's
jurisdiction,6 or was "present" within the forum 7 when he carried on a
certain amount of business therein, the courts were able to broaden con-
siderably their power over nonresidents in all types of judicial proceedings.
The use of these fictions as a basis for state power led however, to much
dispute over the amount and kind of business activity necessary to give
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 3848 et seq. (Michie 1942). To protect their citizens from
fraud and unfairness in the sales of certificates of insurance and other forms of securi-
ties, this Act requires sellers of securities to meet many conditions before they are
permitted to operate. They must, among other requirements, furnish detailed informa-
tion on the securities to be offered and the solvency of the offerors, and the Secretary
of the Commonwealth must be appointed their agent to receive service of process.
2. Section 6 of the Act provides for service by registered mail where other types
of service are unavailable ". . . because the offering is by advertisement and/or solici-
tation through periodicals, mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, or other means of com-
munication from beyond the limits of the State ... " VA. CoDE ANN. § 3848(52)
(Michie 1942).
3. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.Od
263 (1949). See Note, 59 YAr L.J. 360 (1950).
4. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90
(1917).
5. See Daum, The Transaction of Business Within a State by a Non-Resident
as a Foundation for Jurisdiction, 19 IOWA L. REv. 421 (1934).
6. E.g., Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Sprately, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
7. E.g., Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
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courts jurisdiction, s and great confusion resulted.9 The amount of activity
required varied as the purpose of seeking jurisdiction varied.'0 When a
court decided that a nonresident was not "doing business" in a state, it
based this finding of fact on the application of certain realistic tests or
standards, yet these were hidden from view by the purported reliance on
fictions and abstractions." In the case of International Shoe Co. v. State
of Washington,'2 the Supreme Court discarded the old, restrictive, formal
methods of determining the question of state jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents, l a and instead, candidly applied the real tests of whether sufficient
activities had been carried on. This involved a consideration of the nature,
quality, and effect of the activities within the forum in relation to the pur-
poses of the proceedings. By doing away with the use of fictions, the de-
cision cleared up many causes of confusion and gave the courts greater
freedom to base their future decisions on more realistic considerations. In
the instant case, the reasoning of the International Shoe Co. case was ap-
plied,'14 along with a consideration of the modem realities of business I5 to
reach a decision going to the substance of the jurisdictional due process
problem.
8. See the discussion in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir.
1943). For the history and rationale of these theories of jurisdiction, see Scott, Juris-
diction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 HARV. L. REv. 871
(1919).
9. Cf. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 205 U.S. 530 (1907) (mere solicitation
of business by agents, not doing business). But cf. International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (solicitation plus some other activity is doing
business). For a discussion of what constitutes "doing business," see 2 MooRE, FED-
MAL PRAc~ric 4.25 (2d ed. 1948) ; Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 Co.
L. REv. 1018 (1925).
10. Compare Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benns,'261 U.S. 140 (1923),
wvith Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). See Old Wayne Mutual
Life Ass'n v. McDonough, supra at 21.
11. See Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1948). Cf.
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930); Doherty v. Goodman,
294 U.S. 623 (1935) ; see Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316, 318
(1943). See Note, 16 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 523, 534 (1949).
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Court, deciding whether a state could hold amen-
able to its taxing power a foreign corporation that had soliciting agents in the forum,
found that there were sufficient "minimum contacts" with the state of a systematic
and continuous nature which gave rise to the liability sued upon, and therefore, it
was ". . . but reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair
play and substantial justice . . ." that the company be amenable to suit in that action.
Id. at 316. The method of service used by the state was personal service on one of
corporation's agents (who was unauthorized to accept service of process) and regis-
tered mail service on the home office of the corporation. About this, the Court said
that due process requirements for jurisdiction are satisfied if adequate notice and a
chance to defend are provided. Id. at 320.
13. "For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those
activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process." International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, supra at 317. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, spra at 141; Smolik v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Co., 222 Fed. 148, 151 (1915).
14. This reasoning emasculated the "mere solicitation" rule (note 9 supra),
which was the basis for the Court's decision in Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n
v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923), a case heavily relied upon by appellants in the instant
case because of the close factual similarity.
15. Cf. Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., supra; Story v. United Insurance Co.,
64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946).
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Many influential factors were considered by the Court, such as the
nature and purpose of the proceedings, the interest of the state in protecting
its citizens,16 the respective results that would proceed from upholding or
denying the state's jurisdiction,' 7 the volume of business appellants had in
the state and the continuity of obligations created between appellants and
residents.' 8 The refusal of the Court to put great weight on the fact that
appellants did not conduct their business in Virginia through use of paid
agents indicates a progressive trend toward expanding jurisdictional au-
thority when sufficient need is demonstrated. Further, a trend away from
"emphasis on the territorial limitations of courts, to emphasis on providing
notice and an opportunity to be heard" may be seen.19 While the proceed-
ing in the instant case was simply one to halt an intruder's unauthorized
activity, and not one by an individual seeking a money judgment, it seems
likely that the desire to protect citizens of a state from injustice at the hands
of nonresidents will force a continuation of the present policy. When a
nonresident violates the laws of a state in which it has certain minimum
contacts, it is certainly reasonable, as long as the notice requirements of due
process are fairly met, to hold him amenable to the courts of the forum.
Criminal Law-Jurisdiction-Assault Committed in an Airplane
Flying Over the High Seas-Defendant was charged with criminal
assault, committed in an American commercial airplane flying over the
high seas between Puerto Rico and New York. The court arrested judg-
ment, holding that the statute condemning assault committed "upon the
high seas" or within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States ' did not extend to the air space over the high seas. United States
v. Cordova et al., 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
Crimes committed in the air are punished according to the laws of the
land directly below, for the jurisdiction of a state extends to the sky.
Crimes committed while flying over the high seas fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the country to which the aircraft belongs, similar to the maritime
law for surface craft on the high seas. Since the jurisdictions of the states
do not extend beyond the three-mile limit, only the Federal Government
has the power to make laws respecting transoceanic aircraft. The only
federal statute applicable to the case at hand is the one defining crimes upon
the high seas or within federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Al-
16. See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, supra.
17. A major consideration in Story v. United Insurance Co., upra.
18. Systematic and continuous activity by a nonresident is generally most im-
portant to the courts. Cf. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, supra. But cf. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
19. Note, 16 U. oF CHL L. Rav. 523, 536 (1949).
1. 18 U.S.C. §§451, 455 (1946), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§5, 7, 113 (Supp. 1950).
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though the scope of admiralty and maritime regulations has been greatly
expanded, and in one case was held to include a seaplane on the ocean'q
surface, 2 recent statutes and decisions have drawn a line in regard to air-
craft. The courts have held that a seaplane is not a "vessel" within
admiralty jurisdiction.3 Congress based the Air Commerce Act of 1926 on
the commerce, rather than the admiralty, clause of the constitution,4 and
that Act states that the navigation and shipping laws of the United States,
when speaking of "vessel" and "vehicle," shall not apply to aircraft. 5 "Ves-
sel" has thus acquired a functional meaning that excludes aircraft, allowing
the growth of a system of aircraft regulation that is not tied to maritime
law. On the other hand "high seas" has developed as a geographical,
rather than functional, term. Thus federal criminal jurisdiction has been
extended to the Great Lakes,6 navigable waters,7 and even the territorial
waters of foreign nations,8 all of which are now included in the term "high
seas." In the face of the expansion of human endeavor into new areas over
which the states cannot exercise jurisdiction, the tendency has been to ex-
tend federal jurisdiction. In this process the phrase "upon the high seas"
has acquired a general meaning. It was decided that the Death on the High
Seas Act of 1920, giving a right of action in admiralty for wrongful death
"occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore," 9
extended to the air space over the ocean. Recognizing that the Act was not
a navigation or shipping law, the court said that the purpose of the Act
was to give a right of recovery in an area where no state had jurisdiction,
and into which only federal power extended.10
In the case at hand, the court was unwilling to extend federal jurisdic-
tion to crimes committed in aircraft over the high seas in the absence of
clear legislative authority. An opposite conclusion, however, would not
have done violence to the principles behind the growth of air law and the
extension of federal jurisdiction. In the first place, the statute in question
was not a shipping law, and none of the principles behind the functional
separation of air and admiralty law are pertinent in determining the mean-
ing of "high seas." Secondly, the phrase "upon the high seas" is used to
mean the air space over the high seas both in federal aircraft regulations,"
2. Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371
(N.Y. 1921).
3. Foss v. Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914) (airplane not
a vessel for salvage purposes) ; United States v. Northwest Air Service, Inc., 80
F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935) (seaplane not a vessel subject to a maritime lien) ; Dollins
v. Pan-American Grace Airways, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (seaplane
not a vessel subject to limitation of liability statute).
4. See Zollman, Admiralty Jurisdiction in. Air Law, 23 MARQ. L. REv. 112 (1939).
5. 44 STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U.S.C. § 177a (1946).
6. United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893).
7. See Note, 28 HARV. L. Rav. 200 (1914).
8. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
9. 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1946).
10. Choy v. Pan-American Airways, 1941 U.S. Av. R. 10, 1941 I Am. Mar. Cas.
483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
11. 52 STAT. 1017 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 623a (1946).
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and in international air law; 12 as a geographical term, it has thus come to
include the air as well as the water. Finally, it is doubtful that Congress,
in enacting the revised Criminal Code in 1948,13 intended to exempt an
important area, over which the Federal Government has sole power, from
such universal sanctions as those against assault, rape, and murder. Only
the Federal Government can define and condemn crimes in American air-
craft over the high seas, and acts far more undesirable than this defend-
ant's will go unpunished if the existing statute is to be narrowly construed.
Habeas Corpus-Exhaustion of Remedies by State Prisoners
Held to Require Petition for Certiorari-Petitioner, imprisoned under
a state conviction, applied to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that at his trial he was deprived of
rights under the Federal Constitution. The writ was denied after a hear-
ing on the merits.' Without having sought United States Supreme Court
review of the decision petitioner applied to the federal district court for
habeas corpus, repeating the allegations of the state action. The Supreme
Court held that the writ was properly denied without a hearing on the
merits. Petitioner should have exhausted available state remedies by pe-
titioning to the Supreme Court for certiorari after the state high court's
refusal of habeas corpus. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
Congress in 1867 vested the federal courts with habeas corpus juris-
diction over state prisoners alleging unconstitutional confinement.2 But
since it was a "delicate" 8 jurisdiction, federal courts restrained their exer-
cise of it for the sake of comity and soon developed a principle of non-
interference with the usual course of state criminal administration. 4 Thus
federal intervention was withheld before state trial,5 and until after direct 6
and collateral 7 attacks on a conviction had failed under state processes-
in short, until state remedial devices had been echausted.8 Appellate re-
course to the United States Supreme Court likewise fell within the con-
cept of available state remedies in the exhaustion doctrine,9 so that inferior
12. Seventh Pan-American Conference (Montevideo, 1933); American Bar
Assoc., REPORT OF STANDING ComminTE ON AERONAUTICAL LAW FOR 1934, 1934 U.S.
Av. R. 215, 225.
13. The language of the revised code is substantially the same as that of the
previous code. See note 1 supra.
1. Ex parte Darr, 84 Okla. Crim. 352, 182 P.2d 523 (1947).
2. 14 STAT. 385 (1867), as amended, 28 USC §2241 (1948).
3. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898).
4. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
5. New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894).
6. Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (1886).
7. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
8. An exception has always been saved for cases of peculiar urgency. Re Loney,
134 U.S. 373 (1901) ; 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1948).
9. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
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federal courts would not entertain the petitions of prisoners who had failed
to seek writs of error to the high Court after state denials of habeas
corpus.' 0 Even after certiorari replaced appeal as of right for the review
of such denials,". dicta persisted that resort to the highest Court of the
land was a requisite of exhaustion of state remedies. 2  In 1948, however,
the first square holding on the matter in Wade v. Mayo '3 declared that
a petition for certiorari was not essential to satisfy the exhaustion precept.
Lower federal courts interpreted the decision as the introduction of flexi-
bility so that failure to seek certiorari was not prohibitive of the writ but
was merely a matter to be given discretionary weight.14  An enactment
into the Judicial Code of the exhaustion principle,' 5 almost simultaneous
with the Wade decision,1 was similarly construed.' 7 The instant case over-
rules the Wade decision and requires a state prisoner alleging unconsti-
tutional confinement to seek Supreme Court relief from a state denial of
habeas corpus as a condition precedent to application for habeas corpus in
a federal district court.
The wavering of the Court on this point of procedure suggests the
dilemma involved. The required petition for certiorari will usually be
fruitless.' 8  When review is allowed, the Court will be confronted with
intricate problems, including those of local law which a district judge could
more readily solve. 9 But the power of a single federal judge in effect
to over-rule the decision of the highest court of a state seems so inappro-
priate as to justify imposition of some restraint. Although such power
must be available on denial of certiorari,20 nonetheless, the Supreme Court
should have the first opportunity to correct state error on a question of
constitutional guarantees. Despite the practical awkwardness of the rule
in the instant decision, it is submitted that it must be approved because
of the higher value of the broad principle of comity, which merits preserva-
tion at the cost of procedural facility, in the present posture of the problem.
However, use of a three-judge district court for hearings in habeas corpus
10. Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).
11. 39 STAT. 726 (1916), 43 STAr. 936 (1925), as amended 28 U.S.C. §344 (1946).
12. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-117 (1944); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S.
760, 764 (1945).
13. 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
14. Application of Baer, 169 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1948), Penna. ex rel Billman v.
Burke, 170 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1948) (writs denied) ; Canada v. Mayo, 170 F.2d 607
(8th Cir. 1948), Collingswood v. Mayo, 173 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1949), U.S. ex rel
White v. Walsh, 174 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948).
16. Two days after the opinion was handed down which Congress accordingly had
not had'time to consider. Instant case at 215 n. 34.
17. Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949). One district court con-
sidered 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as depriving Wade v. Mayo, supra, of controlling force, Lyle
v. Stewart, 80 F. Supp. 167 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
18. See Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpss, 10 Oino ST. L.J. 337, 349.
This point seems to have been determinative of Justice Frankfurter's dissent, instant
case at 219.
19. Id. at 228-232.
20. Id. at 226-228.
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cases, with abandonment of the certiorari requirement, has been suggested 21
This solution accords deference to the interests of comity, while including
the practical advantages of assigning habeas corpus cases to the district
courts in the first instance. It is further submitted that this balanced
compromise should be adopted as a permanent procedure for these cases.
Habeas Corpus-Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Issue the Writ
to Nonresident Enemy Aliens- Twenty-one German nationals were
convicted by an American Military Commission sitting in China, for aiding
the Japanese Government after German capitulation. They petitioned the
District Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus from
a military prison in Landsberg Germany. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reinstated the District Court's ruling denying jurisdiction,1 on the ground
that physical presence in the territorial jurisdiction of the petitioned Dis-
trict Court is a prerequisite to the issuance of the writ to an enemy alien.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 70 Sup. Ct. 936 (1950).
Both friendly and enemy aliens, within the borders of the United
States, have been granted ever increasing access to American Courts.
The right of the alien to petition against executive deportation except upon
full and fair hearing has long been recognized.2 An enemy alien's right
to bring a civil suit has been recently reaffirmed.3 German saboteurs were
permitted to contest the jurisdiction of a military tribunal sitting in the
United States.4 Even where an enemy alien had been convicted of a war
crime by an American Military Commission sitting in the Philippines, he
was permitted to contest denial of habeas corpus by the Philippine Su-
preme Court while the American courts retained a power of review over
that body.5 However, aliens outside the territory of the United States are
much more limited in their ability to invoke the protections of the courts.
For example, the courts are not so rigidly bound by requirements of due
process when considering petitions of aliens seeking entry into the United
States as they are in the cases of aliens within the country petitioning
against deportation.6 In the instant case the demarcation between the
21. Report of the Judicial Conference, REP. Arr'y. GEN. 67-68 (1943) ; Note, 61
HARv. L.R. 657, 665 (1948). This is one phase of the agitation for general reform of
habeas corpus procedure in federal courts; see Hon. John J. Parker, Limiting the
Abuse ol Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
1. The Circuit Court was of the opinion that the District Court possessed the
jurisdiction to issue the writ. See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 70 Sup. Ct. 158 (1949).
2. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
3. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942).
4. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
5. It re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
6. RoTTsHAErER, CONSTITUIONAL LAW, 375 (1939); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (Chinese Exclusion case), 130 U.S. 581 (1888).
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rights of resident and nonresident aliens was further delineated in the
area of habeas corpus.
By statute district judges are authorized to issue the writ of habeas
corpus "within their respective jurisdictions." 7 That phrase was con-
strued in Ahrens v. Clark 8 to mean respective territorial jurisdictions, thus
limiting citizens, friendly aliens and enemy aliens present within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of a district court to petitioning within that district. The
court, in that case, specifically reserved the question of whether the decision
was applicable to situations involving nonresidents. 9 Indeed, it was later
indicated that the Ahrens decision, being directed toward the prevention
of interdistrict jurisdictional clashes, was not in point where the petitioner
was not within the territorial jurisdiction of any district court.10 But in the
instant case, the court relied on the implications of the Ahrens decision to
bar nonresident enemy aliens from access to the courts, once again drawing
a distinction between the rights of resident and nonresident aliens to in-
voke the aid of American courts.
At most, this distinction is an artificial one.' More vital, no doubt,
in producing the decision were judicial cognizance of the administrative
difficulties sure to follow a contrary ruling and a desire to maintain the
present flexible system of reviewing military convictions. It is estimated
that over 400,000 persons have been tried by American military tribunals
abroad,12 of whom 8000 have been convicted and imprisoned abroad.
13
Great problems would be presented in handling the petitions which would
be filed if overseas prisoners were allowed to petition for writs of habeas
corpus.' 4  A further problem would be presented in transporting from
abroad those to whom the writ issued. However, it is submitted that
these admitted administrative difficulties should not be permitted to over-
ride Anglo-American concepts of extending every procedural safeguard to
the accused criminal. Suggested as devices which might mitigate the diffi-
culties are: (a) Congressional allocation of the petitions among the vari-
ous circuits; '5 (b) Congressional or judicial redefinition of the categories
of persons who would be allowed to petition; 18 (c) Wider use of the
7. 62 STAT. 964 (1948) as amended 63 STAT. 105 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Supp.
1949).
8. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
9. Id. at 192.
10. "In Ahrens v. Clark, supra, we were dealing with the distribution of judicial
power among the several District Courts. . . . But it does not follow that where
the place is not within the territorial jurisdiction of any District Court, judicial power
to issue the writ is rendered impotent." Concurring opinion in Hirota v. MacArthur,
338 U.S. 197, 201 (1948).
11. See dissent in instant case at 952.
12. Nobleman, American Military Government Courts in Germany, 267 ANNALS
87, 95 (1950).
13. Brief for Petitioners, p. 56 n. 41a.
14. Cf. Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890
(1945).
15. This is the solution presented with reference to citizens abroad in Wolfson,
Americans Abroad and Habeas Corpus, 9 FED. BJ. 142, 146-149 (1948).
16. Fairman. Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1
STAN. L. REv. 587, 643 (1949).
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Ipractice approved in Walker v. Johnston 17 of hearing the legal merits of
the petition on a rule to show cause why the writ should not be issued,
-without requiring the physical presence of the petitioner. Only if the writ
were issued would it be necessary to produce the petitioner before the
*court.'8 Such devices would combine administrative efficiency with an ade-
.quate system of military justice.
International Law-U. N. Charter-Discriminatory State Law
Conflicts With United Nations Charter-California's Alien Land
Law ' prohibits aliens, who are ineligible for citizenship, from owning prop-
erty in the state. A Japanese alien instituted suit to determine whether
property he had acquired by deed escheated to the state through operation
of that law. The court on appeal reversed, and declared the Act invalid
as violating the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter.2  Sei Fujii
v. California, 97 Cal. App. 154, 217 P.2d 481 (2d Dist. 1950).
State laws are invalid when they conflict with provisions of the Federal
Constitution or laws passed in pursuance thereof.3 Historically treaties
have been regarded as equivalent to an act of the legislature only when they
are self executing, i.e. when they can operate without enabling legislation.
4
Whether a treaty is self-executing or requires implementing legislation is
for the court to decide, and that determination necessarily depends upon
the terms of the agreement. 5 Previous cases involving the construction of
treaties indicate a characteristic distinction between self-executing and
executory treaties. A treaty which confers rights directly on individuals
is considered self-executing, 6 e.g. ". . . Chinese subjects . . . in the
United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions
as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most
favored nation." 7 A treaty, wherein the contracting nations agree to per-
form particular acts, addresses itself to the political department and requires
a legislative act to make it a rule for the court,8 e.g. "The rights of priority
17. 312 U.S. 275, 284 (1941).
18. See Fairman, supra note 16, at 641.
1. CAL GEr. LAWs act 261, §§ 1, 2, 7 (Deering, 1944).
2. U.N. CHARTER Art. 1, II 12, 3; Art. 2, 2; Art. 55.
3. Panhandle Oil Company v. State of Mississippi e rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218
(1928).
4. Foster and Elan v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829); Dickinson, Are the
Liquor Treaties Self-executing? 20 Am. J. INTL'. L. 444 (1926).
5. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Pan-American Airways,
58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
6. Z. & F. Assets Realization Corporation v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
7. 16 STAT. 740 (1868) (Burlingame Treaty), In re Tiburcio Parrot, 1 Fed. 481
(C.C.D. Cal. 1880) ; In re Ah Chong, 2 Fed. 733 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880). For cases in-
volving similar terms see Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) ; Hauenstein v. Lyn-
ham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880).
8. Robertson v. General Electric Company, 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929).
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for patents shall be extended by each of the high contracting parties in
favor of all nationals of the other high contracting parties . . ." '
Whether the U.N. Charter provisions are self-executing or not was not
discussed by two state courts which refused to apply the Charter to strike
out restrictive covenants,' 0 nor was this problem recognized by a Canadian
court which recently referred to the Charter in voiding a restrictive cove-
nant." The instant court completely ignored the self-executing criterion
in holding that the U.N. Charter is the supreme law of the land, "and is
paramount to every law of every state in conflict with it." 12
The Charter provisions quoted by the California Court import a con-
tract on the part of the signatory nations to fulfill certain obligations; 18
therefore, these provisions are not self-executing. The courts refusal to
consider whether or not the provisions are self-executing paved the way for
its holding, yet its disregard for this doctrinal criterion without any ex-
planation for so doing makes the decision vulnerable and unconvincing.
Though the invalidation of the Alien Land Law is a desirable result, the
instant decision, besides lacking a legal basis, sets a dangerous precedent
whereby judges will be able to apply the amorphous human rights provi-
sions of the Charter to invalidate laws or private contracts which make
distinctions on account of sex, race, color, langauge, property, birth or
status. 14 Such vast discretion in the hands of the judiciary was probably
not foreseen when the Charter was ratified by the United States Senate.' 5
Notwithstanding the decision's defects, however, there is a great deal of
good to be found in the court's recognition of the concerted opinion which
led to the insertion of human rights provisions in the Charter-that racial
and religious minorities can be protected by international agreement.16
With this judicial impetus, Congress, in accordance with the theory of
Missouri v. Holland,'7 might utilize the U.N. Charter as a basis for civil
9. SEN. Doc. No. 49, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) (Treaty of Versailles) Robert-
son v. General Electric Company, 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929). For cases involving
similar terms see Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829) ; Rousseau v.
Brown, 21 App. D.C. 73 (1903).
10. Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947) (Charter is not
applicable to the contractual rights of United States citizens in domestic litigation),
rev'd on other grounds, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Miscellaneous 310,
69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct.) (U.N. Charter Art. 2, 7 prevents intervention in do-
mestic affairs), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 789, 75 N.Y.S.2d 768 (2d Dep't. 1947), rev'd on
other grounds, 298 N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d 325 (1948).
11. Re Drummond Wren, [1945] 4 D.L.R. (Ont. H.C.).
12. Instant case at p. 488.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. Editorial, The United Nations Charter and the Constitution, 36 A.BA..J. 652
(Aug. 1950).
15. Ibid.
16. See Jessup, The Subjects of a Modern Law of Nations, 45 MICH. L. Rav. 383
(1947).
17. ". . . there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well-
being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such
an act could . . ." 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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rights legislation of a broader scope than would be permitted under the
Constitution. In this way the result reached by the instant court, as well
as other worthwhile objectives, could be attained within our existing legal
framework by Congress, which theoretically reflects public opinion to a
greater degree than the courts do. The future will tell whether the legisla-
ture will take cognizance of the California court's effort to give practical
meaning to the U.N. Charter.
Labor Law-Walsh-Healey and Fair Labor Standard Acts Not
Mutually Exclusive-Workers in a Government-owned plant produc-
ing munitions under a "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contract between an independ-
ent contractor and the War Department sued the former under the Fair
Labor Standard Act 1 for overtime compensation, liquidated damages and
attorney fees. The contract, however, expressly provided that the pro-
visions of the Walsh-Healey Act 2 should apply.3 In reversing an unan-
imous Eighth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court held that since the two
Acts supplement each other the workers could recover under FLSA despite
the remedies available under the previously stipulated Walsh-Healey Act.
Powell, et al. v. United States Cartridge Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 755 (1950).
The main difference between the Acts is that under FLSA the em-
ployee himself sues for overtime, liquidated damages in an amount equal
to the overtime, and attorney fees, while under Walsh-Healey the Gov-
ernment sues for the employees and only for the overtime, there being no
double recovery in the form of liquidated damages under this method. The
minimum wage under FLSA is set by law while in the other Act the Sec-
retary of Labor determines what is the prevailing local wage for that in-
dustry and that becomes the minimum. The local wage is generally much
higher than the seventy-five cents under FLSA. Since its enactment,
the Supreme Court has viewed FLSA with favor and by judicial interpre-
tation has greatly broadened its coverage, 4 yet the Court does recognize that
the act has its limits.5 In fact, Congress even cautioned against overly
liberal interpretations of FLSA in the preamble to the Portal to Portal
Act of 1947.6 The particular point in the instant case had never been
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§201-19 (1946).
2. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§35-45 (1946).
3. Transcript of Record, p. 783, United States Cartridge Co. v. Powell, 174 F.2d
718, 721 (8th Cir. 1949).
4. See A. B. Krischbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (maintenance em-
ployees of office building) ; Borden Company v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945) (same).
5. "In the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . Congress did not intend that the
regulation of hours and wages should extend to the furthest reaches of federal author-
ity." McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493 (1943) (meal servers to railroad
hands) ; and see Nieves v. Standard Dredging Corp., 152 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1945)
(dredgers in bay).
6. 61 STAT. 84 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (Supp. 1950).
1950]
256 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99'
ruled upon by the high court, 7 and the circuits differed as to whether
FLSA applied to "cost-plus" contracts, where the Walsh-Healey Act
applies. 8 These opposing views stem from the fact that each Act--despite
a common fundamental purpose to raise the standard of living of workers-
is aimed at controlling different areas. FLSA affects those involved in
interstate commerce while Walsh-Healey affects those working under Gov-
ernment contracts involving more than $10,000. The Supreme Court did
not view these areas as mutually exclusive, but instead saw them as over-
lapping.
The decision is based mainly upon the theory that the aim of FLSA
is for broad coverage and that there is no reason why the best portions
of each Act cannot apply to petitioners. As a result of this reasoning it is
now possible for the Government to file claim for unpaid overtime under
Walsh-Healey while the workers are claiming compensation for the same
underpayment under FLSA. The employer is likely to be faced with such
double suits if the Government decides to sue itself and thus save the
expense of liquidated damages on these "cost-plus" contracts 9 which in
this case amounts to an estimated 250 million dollars.'0 Since it is im-
possible to grant recovery of the identical compensation to both the Gov-
ernment and the workers, a decision on the merits of the overtime suit
in favor of the employees would mean that the suit the Government brings
under Walsh-Healey would be defeated on the grounds that the underpay-
ment had been cured by allowing the workers to win. Yet this auto-
matically doubles the Government's burden since it has a legal right to
hold damages to a single recovery under Walsh-Healey.' On the other
hand, allowing the Government to win denies the employees their liquidated
damages to which they have a legal right under FLSA.' 2 The workers
could recover these damages if the Court adopts the view that the Gov-
ernment's recovery is similar to those cases in which the employer pays
the overdue overtime and then is sued for the damages.1 3 In these cases
the employees prevail. Which method of recovery will be allowed is indeed
questionable. The resulting financial windfall of recovery under FLSA by
the workers would indicate that the Court lost sight of the fact that the
purpose of the Act's liquidated damage clause was that, since failure to
pay the minimum overtime could be detrimental to the standard of living,
7. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 164 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1947), vacated and
remhanded, 334 U.S. 249 (1948) ; Reed v. Murphey, 168 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1948),
vacated and remanded, 335 U.S. 865 (1948).
8. Granting recovery: Bell v. Porter, 159 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1946), order grant-
ing cert. vacated, 330 U.S. 813 (1947) ; Lasater v. Hercules Powder Co., 72 F. Supp.
264 (E.D. Tenn. 1947), aff'd 171 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1948). Denying recovery: Ken-
nedy v. Silas Mason Co., supra note 7; Divins v. Hazeltine Electronics Corp., 163 F.2c1
100 (2d Cir. 1947).
9. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 254 (1948).
10. See instant case at 771 (dissenting opinion).
11. 49 STAT. 2037 (1936), 41 U.S.C. §36 (1946).
12. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
13. Rigopoulos v. Kervan, 140 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1943).
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the pay should be doubled to restore that standard. 14 Although it is true
that after a five year wait a recovery of only the overtime is hardly enough
to reestablish any minimum standard of living which had deteriorated,
nevertheless, it would not appear that such a situation is applicable here
since the Army itself, who as an "employer" followed the intent of Con-
gress, believed that the petitioners in these cases were well paid,15 and,
consequently, that a single recovery under Walsh-Healey would be ade-
quate. Since the workers have a means of recovering their due, since
their standard of living is unimpaired, since certain conflicts are bound
to arise as to which law shall prevail, and since sound legal reasoning could
- support the exclusiveness of each Act, it would seem that the wiser and
definitely more economical result would be to declare that FLSA does not
apply to "cost-plus" contracts.
Perpetuities-Vertical Separability of Gifts to the Same Genera-
tion-Testator by will created a trust which provided for the payment
of income to his son, A, for life, then to A's children for their lives, and
on the death of each child, "his or her share" of the principal to be dis-
tributed to his or her heirs. When the testator died, A was still alive and
had four living children, the only children ever born to A. After A and
one of his children, B, had both died, the children of B claimed that they
were entitled to B's share of the corpus. The court below held that the
gift to B's children was invalid under the Rule against Perpetuities.' The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed this decision on the grounds that,
when the gifts over to the heirs of children of A, living at testator's death,
were considered separate from the gifts over to heirs of possible children
of A born after testator's death, the former were not too remote. In re
Harrah's Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587 (1950).
Whenever a disposition involves first, a valid class gift to life bene-
ficiaries, and second, a gift over of each class member's share to his chil-
dren, then each of these separate or canalized gifts of corpus is judged
separately as to its validity under the Rule against Perpetuities. This is
the generally followed rule of Cattlin v. Bron.2 It is frequently confused
with the rule of Leake v. Robinson,3 which may be stated thus: Whenever
14. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
15. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., mipra note 7 at 254.
1. Harrah Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C. 69 (O.C. Phila. 1949).
2. 11 Hare 372, 68 Eng. Reprints 1319 (Ch. 1853) ; accord, see cases collected in
GRAY, PERPETuTmEs § 389 n. 4 (4th Ed. 1942) ; 2 SImEs, FuTuRE INTEESTS § 528 n. 56
(1936).
3. 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Reprints 979 (Ch. 1817) ; accord, Lawrence v. Smith, 163
Ill. 149, 45 N.E. 259 (1896) ; Coggins' Appeal, 124 Pa. 10, 16 At]. 576 (1889) ; Hooper
v. Wood, 97 W. Va. 1, 125 S.E. 350 (1924). Contra: Harrah Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.
69 (O.C. Phila. 1949). See also Rocap's Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C. 518 (O.C. Phila.
1940).
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the disposition is in favor of a single class, then the possibility that some
person may become a member of that class at a time which is too remote
makes the gift to the entire class void. The distinction between these two
cases is a factual distinction between one gift to one class and many gifts
each to a separate class. As applied to the instant case, the difference rests
on whether the great-grandchildren of the testator are to be considered,
from the terms of the trust, as one big class taking per capita, or as many
classes, each of which is to take only that segment of the principal from
which its parent received income. The case was one of first impression
for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and it followed the unshaken
precedent of other American jurisdictions, 4 the rule of the Restatement,5
and its own rationale in a contiguous case.6
Whenever the Rule against Perpetuities operates to invalidate an in-
terest, it naturally defeats the testator's intentions. This result was origi-
nally brought about by the desire of the courts to curtail the almost per-
petual tying-up of land by the indestructible estate tail and other dynastic
devices.7 Since its original adoption, courts have mechanically applied its
mathematical requirements without much concern for either the realities of
the case at'hand or the reasons behind the rule.8 This is especially true when
it comes to applying that portion of the rule adopted by the court in Leake
v. Robinson.9 However undesirable this phase of the rule may be, it is
still not without limits, and any court which has committed itself to Leake v.
Robinson should definitely follow the doctrines of the law of future inter-
ests one step further and adopt Cattlin v. Brown; otherwise the destructive
effect of the Rule against Perpetuities will be far greater than originally
intended, and even greater than the English precedent upon which the
whole law of future interests is founded. The Pennsylvania legislature had
already indicated that it did not desire to see the Rule against Perpetuities
applied as relentlessly as it previously had been.10 The decision in the insant
case not only follows that express intention, but also aids all subsequent in-
terpretations of future interests, whether under the act or not," by adopting
as part of the law of Pennsylvania, the doctrine of vertical separability.'
2
This doctrine should rescue many interests from the destructive force of the
rule of Leake v. Robinson, and thereby aid courts in reaching results which
are as desirable as that of the instant case.
4. Smith's Estate v. C.I.R., 140 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944); Albert v. Albert, 68
Md. 352, 12 Atl. 11 (1888) ; Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530, 18 N.E. 412 (1888).
5. 'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 389 (1944).
6. Kerns' Estate, 296 Pa. 348, 145 Atl. 824 (1929).
7. Leach, The Ride Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARv. L. REV.
1329, 1331 (1938).
8. Id. at 1329.
9. Id. at 1330.
10. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 301.4 (Purdon, 1950).
11. The Estates Act of 1947 only applies to instruments becoming effective after
January 1, 1948.
12. Vertical separability applies to the separation of gifts to beneficiaries in the
same generation for the purpose of determining the validity of each gift, whereas hori-
zontal separability refers to the separation of gifts to beneficiaries of 'different genera-
tions for the same purpose.
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Water and Watercourses-Rights of the Federal Government in
the Texas Tidelands-The United States brought an action against
the State of Texas for a decree establishing Federal rights in submerged
lands off the coast of Texas, seaward of the ordinary low water mark.
Texas' claim to these lands was based upon the ownership asserted by the
Republic of Texas prior to its admission into the Union in 1845. The
Court recognized the title of the Republic of Texas, but held that it was
relinquished to the United States under a clause of the Joint Resolution of
Congress which admitted Texas to the Union "on an equal footing with the
existing states."' United States v. Texas, 70 Sup. Ct. 918 (1950).
The thirteen original states never surrendered the subsoil of their
navigable waters to the Federal Government.2  Thus it was consistently
held 3 that to deny ownership of these lands to states admitted to the Union
subsequent to its formation would deny them admission on the "equal
footing" guaranteed by their Acts of Admission. When the Federal Gov-
ernment asserted its jurisdiction over the oil-laden continental shelf 4 in
1945,5 it was faced with the opposing claims of the littoral states. In the
first Federal-state litigation over the so-called tidelands, 6 California relied
on the "equal footing" doctrine, which had previously been applied only to
the shores and beds of inland waters. The Court, in the California case,
refused to extend the doctrine to lands seaward of the ordinary low water
mark, reasoning that it was the Federal Government, and not the states,
which had first asserted ownership over this area.7 The California deci-
sion determined that the Federal Government should have "paramount
rights" 8 in the subaqueous oil lands, because protection and control of the
marginal seas "is a function of national external sovereignty." 9 The same
rationale was supplied in a similar suit against Louisiana.'0 However Texas
presented a singular problem, since her claim of ownership antedated that
1. See Joint Resolution approved March 1, 1845, 5 STAT. 797.
2. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367 (U.S. 1842).
3. United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391 (1903); Weber v. Board of
Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57 (U.S. 1873); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212
(U.S. 1845).
4. The continental shelf is a comparatively shallow expanse of ocean floor ex-
tending under the waters adjacent to the North American Continent. It slopes from
the coasts to a depth of approximately 600 feet and is about 70 miles wide at the
mouth of the Rio Grande River. Hardwicke, Illig and Patterson, The Constitution
and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEXAS L. Rxv. 398 (1948).
5. See Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 FED. REG. 12303 (1945). "... the
Government of the United States regards the natural resources . . . of the conti-
nental shelf . . . as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction
and control."
6. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
7. Secretary of State Jefferson, in a note to the British minister in 1793, put for-
ward the first official American claim for a three-mile zone in the marginal belt. See
United States v. California, supra at 33 n.16. See also JEssup, THE LAW or TE i-
TOI AL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDIcTIoN 6, 50 (1927).
8. United States v. California, supra at 38.
9. Id. at 34. For a discussion of the issue of ownership as an incident of sover-
eignty, see Comment, Conflicting State and Federal Clahns of Title in Submerged
Lands of the Continental Shelf, 56 YALE L.J. 356 (1947).
10. United States v. Louisiana, 70 Sup. Ct. 914 (1950).
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of the Federal Government.11 Faced with this assertion of title, the Court
in the instant case has made an unprecedented use of the "equal footing"
doctrine to decide that the Federal Government, and not the State of Texas,
shall have complete rights of ownership in the Texas tidelands, and its oil
reserves, so all important to national defense.
The instant case marks the first use of the "equal footing" clause to
sever from a state property which it concededly ' 2 owned prior to its ad-
mission into the Union. Should another state come up with an even more
compelling claim than Texas, the clause will now provide ammunition for
a ready rejoinder, since it appears in the enabling Act or the Act of Ad-
mission of every state admitted to the Union after the original thirteen.13
As long as oil remains essential to the security of the nation, the Court, in
determining who should control these lands, will find a way to abandon
strict title theory in favor of the more nebulous principle of sovereignty.
14
Thus, viewed in the light of the California and Louisiana cases, the decision
in United States v. Texas should end any state's hopes of reaping the rich
harvest that underlies the marginal seas. 15
11. By the Act of December 19, 1836, the Republic of Texas explicitly established
its seaward boundary as extending three leagues (about 10.5 miles) into the Gulf of
Mexico. 1 LAws, REP. OF TEXAS 133 (1836), 1 LAWS oF TEXAS 1193 (Garnmel 1898).
Since Texas did not belong to the Union at this time, this area could not have been
contemplated by the Federal Government when it made its first claim. See note 7
supra.
12. See Instant case, at 923.
13. Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the
States in Landholding, 28 TEXAS L. Rxv. 43 (1949).
14. Even if Justices Clark and Jackson, who abstained in the instant case, should
participate in a future decision, a continued majority for Federal ownership seems
assured, in as much as Mr. Justice Clark argued the California case while serving as
Attorney General and has since defended the Government's position. See Clark, Na-
tional Sovereignty and Dominion over Lands Underlying the Ocean, 27 TEXAS L. REV.
140 (1948).
15. In 1948 alone, the State of Texas realized $7,000,000.00 from tideland leases
to oil operators at the rate of $20.00 an acre. The Texas Tidelands, A Heritage of
the Texas Public Schools, an unpublished speech delivered by Price Daniel, Attorney
General of Texas, before the Texas State Teachers Association, November 25, 1949.
